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Abstract
When the number of players is small in a weighted majority voting game, it can occur that one of
the players has no inﬂuence on the result of the vote, in spite of a strictly positive weight. Such
a player is called a “dummy” player in game theory. The purpose of this paper is to investigate
the conditions that give rise to such a phenomenon and to compute its likelihood. It is shown
that the probability of having a dummy player is surprisingly high and some paradoxical results
are observed.
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11 Introduction
The main teaching of the literature on power indices is that, in a collective choice process,
voting power or inﬂuence need not to be proportional to the relative number of votes (weight)
an individual or a group (player) is entitled to. An extreme and striking consequence of this
non proportionality is that a player can have a positive weight but never be a member of a
minimal winning coalition (a coalition that wins and the removal of a single player does not
allow the coalition to win any longer). Such players have no voting power and are known as
dummies.
The most famous example of this somewhat paradoxical phenomenon is oﬀered by Luxembourg
in the Council of Ministers of the EU between 1958 and 1973. Luxembourg held one vote,
whereas the quota for a proposition to be approved was 12 out of 17. Since other member
states held an even number of votes (4 for Germany, France and Italy, 2 for Belgium and The
Netherlands), Luxembourg formally was never able to make any diﬀerence in the voting process
and was a dummy.
Another well known case of dummies involves Nassau County, New York. Nassau County’s
government took the form of a Board of Supervisors, one representative for each of various
municipalities, who cast a block of votes. Here are the weighted voting systems used at various
times by Nassau County. The passing quota shown reﬂects the number of votes needed to pass
“ordinary legislation”.
1958 1964
Hempstead 1 9 31
Hempstead 2 9 31
North Hempstead 7 28
Oyster Bay 3 21
Long Beach 1 2
Glen Cove 1 2
Total votes 30 115
Quota 16 58
The numerical weights were chosen to try to take into account the populations of the diﬀerent
municipalities, which were quite disparate. It is easy to see that in 1958, Oyster Bay, Long
Beach and Glen Cove were dummies. It can also be checked that, in 1964, there were two
dummies (Glen Cove and Long Beach). After 1964, the quota was raised to guarantee that no
municipality was a dummy.
A third example of dummy has recently been discovered by one of the authors (see Blancard
and Lepelley, 2010) in a community of municipalities in La R?union (France). This community,
called CIVIS (Communaut? Intercommunale des VIlles Solidaires), gathers ﬁve municipalities:
Saint-Pierre (15 representatives in the community council), Saint-Louis (10 representatives),
L’Etang-Sal? (4), Petite-?le (4) and Cilaos (3), the number of representatives being roughly
proportional to the municipality population . In the community Council, 19 votes are necessary
2for a proposition to be accepted. If we suppose that the representatives of a municipality vote
as a block, it can be seen that Cilaos is a dummy: all the winning coalitions containing Cilaos
remain winning when this municipality is removed.
The possibility of dummy players is clearly problematic from a democratic point of view and
the diversity of the examples given above suggests that the occurrence of dummies in voting
games is of practical concern and could be less rare that expected in ﬁrst analysis. What is
the likelihood of such an undesired phenomenon ? How the distribution of weights should be
arranged in order to avoid the occurrence of dummies in voting games?
We propose in this paper a theoretical investigation of these issues in the context of weighted
majority games, where the quota is equal to the half of the total number of votes, plus one.
Our framework and our main assumptions are introduced in Section 2. We propose some
analytical results in Section 3 for weighted voting games with 4, 5 and 6 players: in each
case, we characterize the distributions of weights giving rise to the occurrence of the “dummy
paradox” and deduce from these characterizations some representations for the likelihood of the
paradox as a function of the total number of votes. Section 4 proposes exact numerical results
for the likelihood of dummy players for more than 6 players and for some speciﬁed values of
the total number of votes. Our results are discussed in Section 5, where we study the impact
of a reduction of the weight scattering on the probability of having some dummies. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Framework and assumptions
We will adopt the following notation:
m is the number of players (or voters). The players are denoted by J1, J2, ..., Jm. N is the
set of all players and a subset of N is called a coalition.
ni is the weight of player i and n =
∑
i ni. Hence, ni can be interpreted as the number of votes
assigned to a member Ji of a voting body. Notice however that, when the players are parties
in a political assembly, the ni’s correspond to the number of representatives of each party and
n is the total number of votes in the assembly.
As mentioned above, we only consider in the present study Weighted Majority Games (WMG):
a proposition is adopted if and only if the total weight of the players in favor of this proposition
is greater or equal to n=2 + 1 if n is even and to (n + 1)=2 if n is odd. In what follows, this
majority quota will be denoted by Q = [n=2]+, where [x]+ is the smallest integer strictly higher
than x. So, a coalition S is winning if and only if
∑
i2S ni  Q; otherwise, the coalition is said
to be loosing.1 A player Ji is a dummy if and only if, for each winning coalition S including
Ji, S   fJig is still winning.
Our main assumptions are the following:
1Notice that, when n is even, the complementary coalition of a loosing coalition is not always winning. In
order to take into account this peculiarity, we will make use of the following notation: Q = Q if n is odd and
Q = Q   1 if n is even.
3(1) the ni’s are integer,
(2) n=2  n1  n2  :::  nm  1,
(3) m and n being given, all the distributions of the ni’s verifying (1), (2) and n =
∑
i ni are
equally likely to occur.
Notice that this framework ﬁts well with the (recent) French local entities called EPCI (Etab-
lissement Public de Cooperation Intercommunale) where each municipality belonging to the
EPCI is given a number of delegates approximately proportionate to its number of inhabi-
tants2. In this context, n1 is the number of delegates of the biggest municipality in the EPCI
council, nm the number of delegates of the smallest, and n is the total number of delegates in
the EPCI council (we suppose that, in this council, the delegates of a given municipality vote
as a bloc). Of course, the biggest municipality should not be a dictator (n1  n=2) and the
smallest one should obtain at least one delegate. In the EPCI council, the current decisions are
taken with a quota Q = [n=2]+.
3 Some analytical results
Proposition 1 In a m-player WMG, (i) the maximum number of possible dummies is equal
to m   3 and (ii) the number of dummies is exactly m   3 if and only if n2 + n3  Q.
Proof. In order to prove (i), we have to show that J3 cannot be a dummy in a m-player majority
game, m  3. Suppose the contrary: J3 is a dummy. A ﬁrst consequence is that J4;J5;:::;Jm
are also dummies. Furthermore, the coalition fJ1;J3g is loosing (if this coalition was winning,
the fact that J3 is a dummy would imply that n1 > n=2, contradicting our assumptions). Now,
if fJ1;J3g is loosing, then fJ1;J3;J4g is also loosing since J4 is a dummy. Similarly, as
J5 is a dummy, the coalition fJ1;J3;J4;J5g is loosing and we can set in the same way that
fJ1;J3;J4;:::;Jmg is loosing, which implies n1 + n3 + n4 + n5 + ::: + nm < Q. As
∑
i ni = n,
we would have n2  n=2, which is impossible.
Consider now assertion (ii) and suppose that n2 + n3  Q. Let’s show this implies that J4
is a dummy. Consider the winning coalitions including J4. Observe ﬁrst that n2 + n3  Q
implies that the coalition fJ4;J5;:::;Jmg is loosing. Observe next that the coalition fJ1;J4g
is also loosing: n2 + n3  Q implies n1 + n4 + n5 + ::: + nm < Q, which implies n1 + n4 < Q.
It follows from these observations that the only winning coalitions with J4 must include two
players among fJ1;J2;J3g. As n2 + n3  Q and n1  n2  n3, we have n1 + n3  Q and
n1 +n2  Q. Consequently, the defection of J4 in these coalitions lets them winning and J4 is
a dummy.
Finally, suppose that J4 is a dummy. This implies that the coalition fJ1;J4g is loosing (if
not, J4 dummy would imply n1  Q, a contradiction). As J5;J6;:::;Jm are (also) dummies,
it follows that fJ1;J4;J5g, fJ1;J4;J5;J6g, ..., fJ1;J4;J5;J6;:::;Jmg are also loosing. But
fJ1;J4;J5;J6;:::;Jmg loosing implies n1+n4+n5+:::+nm < Q and, consequently, n2+n3 
2The CIVIS we have mentioned in the Introduction is an example of EPCI.
4Q. As J4 dummy makes n2 + n3 = Q impossible in the case where n is even, we ﬁnally
conclude that we must have n2 + n3  Q. 2
Corollary 1 There is no dummy player in a 3-player WMG and, in a 4-player WMG, J4 is a
dummy player if and only if n2 + n3  Q.
The following proposition deals with 5-player and 6-player WMG’s.
Proposition 2 (i) In a 5-player WMG, J5 is a dummy player if and only if one of the following
cases holds:
- case 1: n2 + n3 + n4  Q and n1 + n4  Q;
- case 2: n2 + n3  Q.
In case 2 (and only in this case), both J4 and J5 are dummy players.
(ii) In a 6-player WMG, J6 is a dummy player if and only if one of the following cases holds:
- case 1: n2 + n3 + n4 + n5  Q and n1 + n5  Q;
- case 2: n2 + n3 + n4  Q and n1 + n4  Q;
- case 3: n2 + n3 + n5  Q and n1 + n4 + n5  Q and n1 + n3  Q;
- case 4: n2 + n3  Q;
- case 5: n2 + n4 + n5  Q and n1 + n2  Q;
- case 6: n3 + n4 + n5  Q.
In case 2, J5 and J6 are dummy players; in case 4, J4, J5 and J6 are dummy players.
The proof of this proposition is rather tedious and is given in Appendix.
Corollary 1 and Proposition 2 allow us to enumerate the distributions of the weights that give
rise to dummy players and to compute the probability of their occurrence in m-player WMG’s,
with m 2 f4;5;6g. Moreover, it is possible to derive from Corollary 1 and Proposition 2
some representations for this probability as a function of n, the total number of votes. This
probability is denoted by P(m;n) in what follows.
Proposition 3 For n  9 modulo 12, the probability of having a dummy player in a 4-player
WMG is given as:
P(4;n) =
n2   33
2(n2 + 3n   12)
:
As a consequence, limn!1P(4;n) = 1
2.
Proof. Given our assumption (3) and for a given value of n, we have to divide the number of
those distributions of the ni’s that give rise to the occurrence of a dummy player (denoted by
D(4;n)) by the total number of possible distributions with 4 players (denoted by T(4;n)). We
begin by evaluating T(4;n). A vector of integers (n1;n2;n3;n4) is a possible distribution of the
weights is and only if
n1  n2; n2  n3; n3  n4; n4  1; n1  n=2 and n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 = n:
We know from Ehrhart’s theory and its recent developments (the reader is referred to Lepelley
et al. (2008) for a presentation of this theory) that the number of integer solutions of such a set
5of (in)equalities is a quasi polynomial in n with periodic coeﬃcients (or Ehrhart’s polynomial).
A periodic coeﬃcient takes various values according to n and to a given period. For example,
c(n) = [1
2; 3
4;1]n is a periodic coeﬃcient with period 3, c(n) = 1
2 if n  0 modulo 3, c(n) = 3
4
if n  1 modulo 3 and c(n) = 1 if n  2 modulo 3. Numerous algorithms exist to derive the
expression of such a quasi polynomial (see, once again, Lepelley et al. (2008)). Using one of


















The period of such a quasi polynomial is the least common multiple of the periods of its coeﬃ-
cients, here 12. Consequently, the expression of T(4;n) corresponds to 12 distinct polynomials;
















(n + 3)(n2   33)
576
:
Now, according to Corollary 1, a dummy player exists if and only if
n1  n2; n2  n3; n3  n4; n4  1; n1  n=2; n2 + n3 > n=2 and n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 = n:





































(n + 3)(n2 + 3n   12)
288
:
The expression of P(4;n) = D(4;n)=T(4;n) for n  9 modulo 12 directly follows, as well as







The two following Propositions are obtained along the same lines as Proposition 3 and their
proofs are omitted.
Proposition 4 For n  15 modulo 120, the probability of having dummy player(s) in a 5-
player WMG is:
P(5;n) =
5(n + 9)(7n3   51n2 + 165n   801)
6(11n4 + 120n3 + 350n2 + 960n + 4815)
:
Consequently, the probability for P5 to be a dummy when n is large is: limn!1P(5;n) = 35
66.
And the limiting probability of having two dummy players (J4 and J5) when n is large is given
as 5
22.
Proposition 5 The limiting probability of having at least one dummy player in a 6-player
WMG is given by: limn!1P(6;n) = 155
312. The limiting probability of having two dummies (J5
and J6) is 5
39 and the limiting probability of having three (J4, J5 and J6) is 5
52.
3Of course, the 11 other polynomials can be derived in the same way.
4It is worth noticing that the coeﬃcient of the leading term of the quasi polynomials is not periodic. This
peculiarity allows to easily obtain the desired probabilities for n large by considering only this coeﬃcient in the
quasi plolynomials.
6Table 1
Probability P(m;n) of having a dummy player
as a function of n (the total number of votes) for m = 4; 5; 6.
n 4-player WMG 5-player WMG 6-player WMG
15 0.4375 0.2609 0.1818
18 0.2258 0.1778 0.0196
21 0.4146 0.2973 0.1978
24 0.2537 0.2302 0.0529
27 0.4578 0.3696 0.2731
30 0.3089 0.2827 0.1002
33 0.4490 0.3818 0.2905
36 0.3235 0.3087 0.1259
39 0.4684 0.4145 0.3310
42 0.3535 0.3398 0.1601
45 0.4637 0.4213 0.3407
48 0.3624 0.3553 0.1809
51 0.4747 0.4402 0.3641
54 0.3813 0.3757 0.2072
57 0.4718 0.4443 0.3711
60 0.3873 0.3859 0.2232
63 0.4789 0.4564 0.3869
66 0.4002 0.4002 0.2431
69 0.4770 0.4593 0.3918
72 0.4045 0.4075 0.2558
75 0.4820 0.4678 0.4028
78 0.4139 0.4181 0.2716
81 0.4806 0.4699 0.4066
84 0.4172 0.4235 0.2818
87 0.4842 0.4761 0.4149
90 0.4243 0.4316 0.2943
93 0.4832 0.4777 0.4177
96 0.4269 0.4359 0.3027
99 0.4860 0.4825 0.4241
. . .
199 0.4928 0.5061 0.4594
202 0.4645 0.4624 0.3935
. . .
limit 1/2 35
66 = 0:530 155
312 = 0:497
7Table 2
Probability P(m;1) of having one, two or three dummies
for m = 4; 5; 6.
m 1 dummy 2 dummies 3 dummies Total
4 0.5 0 0 0.5
5 0.3030 0.2273 0 0.5303
6 0.2724 0.1282 0.0962 0.4968
The next section deals with the cases with more than six players.
4 Results for more than six players
In the 5-player case, 120 diﬀerent formulas are necessary to compute all the probabilities P(5;n)
(see Proposition 4 for one of them). The number of diﬀerent formulas is exponentially increasing
when m increases and it becomes practically too complicated to list all of them when m is higher
than 6. In order to obtain the desired probabilities for more than 6 players, we make use of a
computer. This is done in two ways: exact computations and simulations. Exact computations
are done with an exhaustive list of all the possible vectors of weights for a given number n
of votes in the assembly. For all these vectors (n1;:::;nm), we check whether or not the last
player is pivotal (decisive) (remember that n1  n2  :::  nm). This is done by computing
the Banzhaf powr index with the generating function method. Finally, the exact probability
of having at least one dummy player is the ratio between the number of times the last player
Jm is never pivotal (decisive) and the number of vectors (n1;:::;nm) considered as admissible
(with a uniform distribution of weights vectors, as done theoretically in the previous section).
Table 3
Probability P(m;n) of having a dummy player
as a function of m for n = 45, n = 50, n = 95 and n = 100.
m n = 45 n = 50 n = 95 n = 100
4 0.4637 0.3735 0.4855 0.4297
5 0.4213 0.3020 0.4806 0.4003
6 0.3407 0.1931 0.4215 0.3091
7 0.2135 0.0858 0.3173 0.1869
8 0.1050 0.0299 0.2017 0.0862
9 0.0434 0.0091 0.0963 0.0304
10 0.0185 0.0030 0.0447 0.0108
11 0.0086 0.0012 0.0194 0.0044
12 0.0044 0.0005 0.0098 0.0017
13 0.0021 0.0002 0.0060 0.0008
14 0.0007 0.0000 0.0038 0.0005
15 0.0004 0.0000 0.0025 0.0003
Simulated probabilities
8Our simulations are based on random vectors of weights. The estimated probability of having
at least one dummy player is then obtained by dividing the number of times the last player Jm
is never pivotal (decisive) by the number of vectors (n1;:::;nm) randomly generated.
Table 4
Simulated5 probability P(1;n) of having one, two ... or x dummies
Number of dummy players
m  1 1 2 3 4 5
4 0.49300 0.49300
5 0.52490 0.29830 0.22660
6 0.49310 0.27140 0.12750 0.09240
7 0.43530 0.24530 0.10460 0.04570 0.03980
8 0.34470 0.21030 0.07970 0.02930 0.01300 0.01240
9 0.25750 0.17250 0.04930 0.01960 0.00790 0.00370
10 0.17750 0.13160 0.02710 0.01000 0.00340 0.00230
11 0.11844 0.09634 0.01440 0.00414 0.00138 0.00074
12 0.07140 0.06044 0.00756 0.00184 0.00058 0.00024
13 0.04340 0.03940 0.00294 0.00062 0.00020 0.00004
14 0.02282 0.02132 0.00114 0.00024 0.00004 0+
15 0.01226 0.01168 0.00046 0.00004 0.00002 0+
0+: the estimated probability is less than 1=50 000
Figure 1. Simulated Probability P(1;n) of having exactly x dummies with m players
510 000 simulations for m < 11 and 50 000 when m  11. Moreover P(1;n) estimating P(99999;n).
95 Discussion and further results
The theoretical risk of having a dummy appears to be very high. It can be suggested that our
calculations possibly overestimate this risk in the case of the french EPCI, which very often
try to reduce the spread (range) of the numbers of representatives in each city. How can we
introduce more realism in our analysis ?
One approach is the following. Let k be the maximal fraction of the total weight given to the
“biggest” player: n1=n  k. We wish to study the impact of parameter k on the probability
of having a dummy player. Under our other assumptions, k belongs to [ 1
m; 1
2]. When k = 1
2,
we recover the situation we have studied in the preceding sections. With k = 1
m, each player
obtains the same weight, hence the same power and there is no dummy. Let P(m;n;k) be
the probability of having a dummy when J1 gets k% of the total weight. It seems natural to
conjecture that P(m;n;k) decreases when k moves from 1
2 to 1
m. The following results show
that this conjecture does not hold for small values of m. We will only give the proof of the ﬁrst
Proposition.6
Proposition 6 In a 4-player WMG with n large, the probability of having a dummy player as
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Proof. Let K be the maximal weight of J1, with k = K=n. In order to compute the desired
probability, we begin by evaluate the total number T(4;n;K) of distributions on the ni’s when
n1 is constrained to be lower or equal to K. T(4;n;K) is the number of integer solutions of
the following inequalities :
n1  n2; n2  n3; n3  n4; n4  1; n1  K n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 = n and K  n=2:
We have now two parameters, n and K, and the number of integer solutions is given by
bivariate quasi polynomials (see Lepelley et al.(2008)). Using an algorithm recently developed
by Barvinok (????), we obtain for n even two distinct quasi polynomials associated with two
validity domains:
For n
4  K < n
3:
T(4;n;K) =   1







3K2 + 2K + c1;
For n










24K2   2K + c2;
where c1 and c2 are periodic constants the value of which depends on both n and K.
Consider the ﬁrst domain. As K = kn, it follows that, for n
4  K < n
3, i.e. for 1
4  k < 1
3:
T(4;n;k) =   1
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2 + 2k)n + c1:
Observe that, in order to compute the limiting probability P(4;1;k), only the coeﬃcient of
the leading term in n3 matters. For this reason, we will only give the coeﬃcient of n3 of the
quasi polynomials we exhibit in the remaining of this proof.
Proceeding as above, we obtain for the second domain, 1
3  k  1
2:





Consider now the number D(4;n;K) of distributions with a dummy player with n1  K. All
we have to do is to add to the above set of inequalities n2 + n3 > n=2. Replacing K by kn in
the quasi polynomials associated with this new set on inequalities gives:
For 1
4  k < 1
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240k3   288k2 + 108k   13
4(44k3   60k2 + 24k   3)
: 2
Proposition 7 In a 5-player WMG with n large, the probability of having at least one dummy
player depends on k as shown in the following representation:
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Proposition 8 In a 6-player WMG with n large, the probability of having at least one dummy
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Exact probability P(m;1;k) of having a dummy player
as a function of k for large n and m = 4; 5; 6.
k 4-player WMG 5-player WMG 6-player WMG
0.23 - 0 0.381
0.25 0.750 0 0.282
0.27 0.750 0.060 0.269
0.29 0.750 0.174 0.311
0.31 0.750 0.270 0.354
0.33 0.750 0.344 0.391
0.35 0.748 0.403 0.418
0.37 0.737 0.452 0.439
0.39 0.718 0.492 0.455
0.41 0.693 0.525 0.469
0.43 0.662 0.549 0.482
0.45 0.624 0.563 0.495
0.47 0.580 0.563 0.505
0.49 0.529 0.547 0.505
0.50 0.500 0.530 0.497
Table 6
Simulated7 probability P(m;9999;k) of having a dummy player
as a function of k and m.
k 7-player WMG 8-player WMG 9-player WMG 10-player WMG
0.23 0.199 0.175 0.146 0.099
0.25 0.235 0.198 0.163 0.117
0.27 0.259 0.221 0.182 0.125
0.29 0.290 0.238 0.192 0.133
0.31 0.319 0.255 0.205 0.143
0.33 0.346 0.271 0.211 0.152
0.35 0.365 0.283 0.219 0.157
0.37 0.376 0.297 0.223 0.160
0.39 0.387 0.302 0.228 0.163
0.41 0.393 0.313 0.234 0.165
0.43 0.402 0.322 0.238 0.167
0.45 0.413 0.333 0.243 0.174
0.47 0.422 0.340 0.247 0.177
0.49 0.428 0.347 0.252 0.180
0.50 0.435 0.435 0.258 0.1775
710 000 simulations for m < 11 and 50 000 when m  11.
126 Concluding remark
We have shown in this paper that the probability of having at least one dummy player in
Weighted Majority Games with a small number of player is very high. This probability can
reach about 50% for 4, 5 or 6 players ; for more than 6 players, the probability decreases but we
have to consider more than 15 players for obtaining results lower than 1%. Of course, it can be
suspected that our probabilistic assumption (all admissible weight distributions are supposed
to be equally likely to occur) could tend to exaggerate the probability of having a dummy. We
have proved however that, for a very small number of players, the introduction of some degree
of homogeneity in the distribution of the weights has a weak impact on this probability.
Finally, it is worth to emphasize that our results are limited to majority games, in which the
quota for a proposition to be approved is equal to 50% of the total weight. It should be of
interest to consider the impact of the quota value on the probability of having a dummy player.
We plan to study this question in another paper.
7 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
(i) In order to characterize the distributions of the ni’s for which J5 is a dummy player, we
consider the set of coalitions to which J5 is susceptible to belong: fJ1;J5g, fJ2;J5g, fJ3;J5g,
fJ4;J5g, fJ1;J2;J5g, fJ1;J3;J5g, fJ1;J4;J5g, fJ2;J3;J5g, fJ2;J4;J5g, fJ3;J4;J5g,
fJ1;J2;J3;J5g, fJ1;J2;J4;J5g, fJ1;J3;J4;J5g, fJ2;J3;J4;J5g and fJ1;J2;J3;J4;J5g.
Consider ﬁrst the two-player coalitions; J5 is a dummy player if these coalitions are loosing
(if not, a zero power for J5 would imply that a coalition with only one player is winning,
contradicting our assumptions) and these two-player coalitions will be loosing if n1 + n5 < Q.
Consider now the coalitions fJ1;J2;J5g and fJ1;J3;J5g; these coalitions are necessarily win-
ning (recall that n1  n2  n3  n4  n5  1, by assumption (2)). J5 is a dummy if we
have n1 + n3  Q (which implies n1 + n2  Q). The next three-player coalitions fJ1;J4;J5g,
fJ2;J3;J5g, fJ2;J4;J5g and fJ3;J4;J5g can be winning or loosing. Hence, J5 is a dummy
if: (n1+n4+n5 < Q or n1+n4  Q) and (n2+n3+n5 < Q or n2+n3  Q) and (n2+n4+n5 < Q
or n2 + n4  Q) and (n3 + n4 + n5 < Q or n3 + n4  Q). Finally, consider coalitions with four
or ﬁve players, which are winning coalitions. J5 is a dummy player is n2 + n3 + n4  Q. To
summing up, J5 is a dummy player if and only if we have:
n1 +n5 < Q and n1 +n3  Q and (n1 +n4 +n5 < Q or n1 +n4  Q) and (n2 +n3 +n5 < Q or
n2 + n3  Q) and (n2 + n4 + n5 < Q or n2 + n4  Q) and (n3 + n4 + n5 < Q or n3 + n4  Q)
and n2 + n3 + n4  Q.
Since
∑
i ni = n, these inequalities can be written in the following way:
n1 + n5 < Q and n1 + n3  Q and (n2 + n3  Q or n1 + n4  Q) and (n1 + n4  Q or
n2 + n3  Q) and (n1 + n3  Q or n2 + n4  Q) and (n1 + n2  Q or n3 + n4  Q) and
n1 + n5 < Q,
Eliminating redundant inequalities, we obtain:
n1 + n5 < Q and n1 + n3  Q and (n2 + n3  Q or n1 + n4  Q) and n1 + n3  Q and
13n1 + n2  Q,
which can be reduced to:
(n1 + n5 < Q and n2 + n3  Q) or (n1 + n5 < Q and n1 + n4  Q).
As n2 + n3  Q implies n1 + n5 < Q and n1 + n5 < Q is equivalent to n2 + n3 + n4  Q, we
ﬁnally obtain:
n2 + n3  Q or (n2 + n3 + n4  Q and n1 + n4  Q), in accordance with Proposition 2 (i).
Furthermore, it follows from Proposition 1 that J4 and J5 are both dummy players if and only
if n2 + n3  Q.
(ii) Proceeding as above, it is easily checked that J6 is a dummy player if and only if a) all the
two-player coalitions including J6 are loosing, b) either fJ1;J2;J6g, fJ1;J3;J6g, fJ1;J4;J6g,
fJ1;J5;J6g, fJ2;J3;J6g are loosing or (respectively) fJ1;J2g, fJ1;J3g, fJ1;J4g, fJ1;J5g,
fJ2;J3g are winning, c) either fJ1;J4;J5;J6g, fJ2;J3;J4;J6g, fJ2;J3;J5;J6g, fJ2;J4;J5;J6g,
fJ3;J4;J5;J6g are loosing or (respectively) fJ1;J4;J5g, fJ2;J3;J4g, fJ2;J3;J5g, fJ2;J4;J5g,
fJ3;J4;J5g are winning, d) fJ1;J2;J3g, fJ1;J2;J4g, fJ1;J2;J5g, fJ1;J3;J4g, fJ1;J3;J5g
are winning, e) fJ1;J2;J3;J4g, fJ1;J2;J3;J5g, fJ1;J2;J4;J5g, fJ1;J3;J4;J5g, fJ2;J3;J4;J5g
are winning and f) fJ1;J2;J3;J4;J5g is winning. This implies a) n1+n6 < Q, b) (n1+n2+n6 <
Q or n1+n2  Q) and (n1+n3+n6 < Q or n1+n3  Q) and (n1+n4+n6 < Q or n1+n4  Q) and
(n1+n5+n6 < Q or n1+n5  Q) and (n2+n3+n6 < Q or n2+n3  Q), c) (n1+n4+n5+n6 < Q
or n1+n4+n5  Q) and (n2+n3+n4+n6 < Q or n2+n3+n4  Q) and (n2+n3+n5+n6 < Q
or n2+n3+n5  Q) and (n2+n4+n5+n6 < Q or n2+n4+n5  Q) and (n3+n4+n5+n6 < Q or
n3+n4+n5  Q), d) n1+n3+n5  Q, e) n2+n3+n4+n5  Q and f) n1+n2+n3+n4+n5  Q.
The reduction of this set of inequalities leads to the six cases given in Proposition 2 (ii). To
complete the proof, it remains to observe that, in case 4, J4, J5 and J6 are dummy players (by
Proposition 1); and if J6 is a dummy and J4 is not (n2 +n3 < Q), then it results from part (i)
of Proposition 2 that J5 is also a dummy player if and only if n1+n4  Q and n2+n3+n4  Q.2
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